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(Published in The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, ed. by Jon Mandle and David Reidy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 845-850.)

Rawls’s substantive conception of social justice, justice as fairness, includes two principles. They are an answer to this question: “viewing society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, what principles of justice are most appropriate to specify basic rights and liberties, and to regulate social and economic inequalities in citizens’ prospects over a complete life?” (JF, 41). The following are three key formulations of the two principles:

FIRST PRINCIPLE
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
SECOND PRINCIPLE
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least disadvantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (TJ, 266)

a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. (PL, 5-6)

(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle). (JF, 42-3)

All formulations require equal basic liberties (in the first principle), fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle (in the second principle). This Entry does not focus on the just savings principle mentioned in the TJ formulation. The formulations in PL and JF do not mention it, but Rawls assumes that it does apply.
	To clarify the content of the principles we can consider five important points. First, the principles apply to the basic structure of society as a dynamic whole, and within that context the first principle applies primarily to the constitution and associated institutions (e.g. courts) while the second applies primarily to the economy and civil society and associated institutions (e.g. legislatures). Rawls claims that the two principles should guide the arrangement of two parts of the basic structure of society (TJ, 53; JF, 47-8). The first principle applies to those aspects of the social system that define the fundamental liberties of citizens. In justice as fairness, such basic liberties are given by a list that includes, for example, “political liberty (the right to vote and hold public office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law” (TJ, 53). The second principle concerns the apportionment of economic and social benefits. It guides the distribution of income and wealth and the mechanisms determining access to positions of authority and responsibility in the economic structure.
	Second, the principles are arranged in a serial order. The first principle has priority over the second principle, and, in the second principle, fair equality of opportunity has priority over the difference principle. Thus, for example, a basic liberty can only be rendered less extensive if this would strengthen the total system of liberties shared by all, and it may be secured in a less than equal way only if this would be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty. It would not be just to limit basic liberties to increase the availability of economic benefits (TJ, 266). This impermissibility of tradeoffs between principles holds so long as we face “reasonably favorable conditions” (JF, 47; PL, 297; see TJ, 55, 132, 214-20).
	Third, the two principles are a specification of a more general conception of justice according to which “All social values … are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage” (TJ, 54). Justice as fairness is an egalitarian conception of justice. It sees all persons, as rational and reasonable cooperators, as having equal claims at the bar of justice. Equal distribution is always the appropriate default position in the division of social advantages, so that any departure requires a especial justification that shows that everyone (and especially the losers) would be benefited. (Sometimes such departures can indeed be justified for reasons of efficiency.)
	Fourth, justice as fairness, like any other conception of justice, needs an objective metric to measure and compare persons’ levels of advantage and to identify what goods justice aims to distribute. For this purpose, Rawls proposes a list of “social primary goods” that includes (i) basic rights and liberties; (ii) freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities; (iii) powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility; (iv) income and wealth; and (v) the social bases of self-respect (JF, 58-9). Thus, for example, the principle of equal liberty frames the distribution of (i) and (ii), the principle of fair equality of opportunity frames the distribution of (iii), and the difference principle frames the distribution of (iv). The social bases of self-respect are secured by the combined implementation of all the principles. Social primary goods are social because their distribution can be determined through the institutions of the basic structure, and they are primary because they are general means all rational persons are presumed to want for their pursuit of their ends (whatever these are) (TJ, 54). The idea of primary goods is reformulated in Rawls’ later work, to refer to the “various social conditions and all-purpose means that are generally necessary to enable citizens adequately to develop and fully exercise their two moral powers, and to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good” (JF, 57).
	Fifth, the principles are concerned with eliminating or mitigating morally arbitrary inequalities. Rawls mentions three kinds of contingencies that may lead to inequalities in people’s life-prospects that are arbitrary from the moral point of view: family and social class of origin, native endowments, and good or bad fortune and luck (TJ, 83; JF, 55). Let us consider how the second principle accounts for this point. To do so, let us discuss, with Rawls, a series of progressively inclusive principles of economic equality: formal equality, liberal equality, and democratic equality (see TJ, sects. 12-13). Formal equality demands non-discrimination. For example, it disallows the arbitrary exclusion of applicants for jobs on the basis of their gender, ethnicity, or class of origin. This goes some way toward developing the idea of equality of opportunity. But Rawls’s second principle goes further, including the idea of liberal equality. The principle of fair equality of opportunity requires that people have a fair chance to attain positions of advantage. It is not enough for careers to be “open to talents” (as in formal equality). People must also be given similar chances to develop whatever talents they are born with. “[S]upposing that there is a distribution of native endowments, those who have the same level of talent and ability, and the same willingness to use these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin, the class into which they are born and develop until the age of reason” (JF, 44). Thus, for example, if Sarah and Maria have the same initial talents and motivation, it would be unjust if Sarah turns out to be more qualified for certain jobs simply because her parents could pay for excellent private education that was unavailable to Maria given her own parents’ relative poverty. A just society would offer Maria affordable public education of the highest quality. However, liberal equality (and Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity) is still not enough. It does not fully address the impact of differing social circumstances (such as those resulting from features of the internal life of the family), and it is silent on inequalities due to differing natural endowments. The idea of democratic equality, which adds the difference principle to the principle of fair equality of opportunity, is more encompassing. The difference principle allows inequalities in income and wealth only when they work to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged. Thus, it might be acceptable that Maria earns more than Laura (who is less motivated or talented even if she comes from a similar social background). But a just society would include mechanisms securing that the privileged condition of people like Maria is coupled with benefits for people like Laura (through redistributive taxation, increased economic productivity, etc.). “We are led to the difference principle if we wish to set up a social system so that no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets or his initial social position in society without giving or receiving compensating advantages in return” (TJ, 87).
	Some additional points regarding the principles are worth making. First, the first principle focuses on a set of liberties given by a list. It does not talk about liberty as such (PL, 291-2; JF, 44). Some conceivable liberties are not basic and have no priority. An example is private property in the means of production (as opposed to personal property, which is part of the list) (TJ, 54). To determine which liberties are basic, in his later work Rawls suggests that “we consider what liberties provide the political and social conditions essential for the adequate development and full exercise of the two moral powers of free and equal persons” (JF, 45; see PL, 310-24). Thus, liberty of conscience and freedom of association are supported by their relation to the capacity to formulate, revise and pursue a conception of the good, and equal political liberties and freedom of thought are supported by their relation to the capacity for a sense of justice. Second, since liberties might clash with each other in practice, the first principle does not see any of them as absolute; instead, it calls for an adequate scheme in which the “central range” of each is protected (TJ, 54; PL, 295-8). To underscore these two points, and in response to powerful challenges by H.L.A. Hart, Rawls changed the formulation of the first principle in PL and JF, referring to an “adequate scheme” rather than to “the most extensive system” of basic liberties (see PL, Lecture VIII) 
Third, Rawls acknowledges that the first principle may be preceded by a prior principle that requires that “citizens’ basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is necessary for citizens to understand and to be able fruitfully to exercise [… the first principle’s] rights and liberties” (PL, 7; JF, 44). Fourth, the first principle includes the demand that the “fair value” of political liberties be secured. This means that we should ensure that “citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly an equal chance of influencing the government’s policy and of attaining positions of authority irrespective of their economic and social class” (JF, 46). This requirement has important distributive effects; for example, it disallows great economic inequalities because of their tendency to translate into political inequality (TJ, 198-9).
Finally, the principles are selected and applied in a “four-stage sequence” that involves a progressive lifting of the veil of ignorance in the original position. The principles are first adopted behind a thick veil of ignorance that only allows general information about human psychology and social organization in the circumstances of justice. The first principle is then applied at the constitutional stage, the second principle at the legislative stage, and both are fully pursued at the final stage of day-to-day legal and political judgment (JF, 48). A consequence of this sequence is that there may be different appropriate implementations of the principles for different social contexts. For example, Rawls considers five kinds of social systems in modern conditions: (a) laissez-faire capitalism, (b) welfare-state capitalism, (c) state socialism with a command economy, (d) property-owning democracy, and (e) liberal (democratic) socialism. Whereas Rawls thinks that (a), (b), and (c) involve violations of the two principles, he suggests that both (d) and (e) could provide full implementations, the choice among them depending on contextual considerations about the political culture and history of particular societies (JF, sects. 41-2).
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